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1. Introduction
Before the failure of the WTO (World Trade Organization) ministerial in Seattle  to
launch the Millenium Round of multilateral trade negotiations it was already possible to
detect a very significant gap between the positions of developing and developed member
countries of the WTO concerning priorities to be considered in the new round.
2 The
position of Latin American members tended to converge with that of other developing
economies. Latin America made considerable concessions in the Uruguay Round. Many
economies bound their tariffs at relatively low levels. Even in the middle of
macroeconomic turmoil in the late 1990’s, with the successive financial crises in Asia,
Russia and Brazil, commitment to liberal trade policies has been on the whole preserved.
The liberalization process has, of course, raised severe problems related to the
accommodation of conflicting interests. Problems arising out of the political economy of
trade are not a monopoly of developed economies. After the very significant reduction of
high tariffs entailed by the Uruguay Round, tariff concessions by developing countries by
further lowering their bound tariff levels shall severely affect established interests which
are favoured by protectionist policies. Most of the region’s economies may face problems
in adjusting in the mid-term to substantial additional tariff reduction undertakings. To
adequately deal with such obstacles, and contribute to create the political conditions
required for further liberalization, Latin American governments need to be able to show
to domestic interests that the developed countries are willing to make significant
concessions by opening their markets in all sectors.
The attempt to launch a new Millenium Round in Seattle in the end of last year was
mainly wrecked by the stances adopted by the European Union, Japan, and the United
States. The European Union and Japan persistently resisted to consider the possibility of a
significant additional reduction of protection affecting agricultural products. The United
States, on the other hand,  made it clear, in a surprising move, that  it would consider as a
sine qua non the inclusion of labour standards in the new round.
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Liberalization entailed by future multilateral trade negotiations should in principle
affect in a balanced way both industrial and agricultural products. There is, for instance,
no economic reason to limit offers of total tariff dismantlement to industrial products. In
the same way that developing economies in the Uruguay Round were expected, and did
fall in line with more liberal trade regimes affecting industrial products, a new round will
have to remove the obstacles which still affect agricultural trade at a much faster pace
than further liberalization affecting industrial products. Convergence in the direction of
less distorted world agricultural markets may, however, require the international
mobilization of resources to cope with the consequences of price rises on vulnerable food
importers.
On the other hand, efforts by developed economies to include in a new round’s
agenda a number of new issues, such as environment and labour rights, which have not
been traditionally dealt with by the World Trade Organization and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the past, introduce a new range of difficulties. The
situation is not dissimilar to that before the launching of the Uruguay Round in the early
1980’s concerning trade-related intellectual property, trade-related investment measures
and services. The important difference is that the economic arguments for the inclusion of
such themes then were sounder than those which are used today in the policy
harmonization debate.
 In spite of initial suggestions by developing countries in the Uruguay Round
negotiations there is no essential difference between arguments in favour of the
liberalization of goods or services if due account is taken of the differences concerning
different modes of supply as liberalization of the provision of services necessarily raises a
lot of problems related to the treatment of foreign investment. Similarly, there is little
doubt about the importance of protection of intellectual property to foster invention.  The
arguments in favour of linking labour and environmental standards to trade measures are
much more controversial  as there are significant doubts on what would be the end impact
on exactly those targets which are thought to be worthwhile to pursue. Compulsory
minimum standards enforced through trade retaliation measures may end up further4
hurting abused workers and the environment, a result which is directly in contradiction
with the alleged aims of such trade measures
3.
In the first section after the introduction of this paper attention will focus on the
analysis of concrete interests of groups of economies in terms of market access. Account
will be taken of the potential differences between Latin American countries in terms of
the balance of interest between multilateral negotiations and regional integration. The
third section will consider other negotiating issues of interest for Latin America,
especially the themes not traditionally dealt with in the WTO/GATT such as:
environment, labour rights and competition policies. The next section will include an
assessment of how to cope with the issue of special and differential  treatment  taking into
account the different level of development of different groups of the Latin American
economies. This will also consider how such provisions worked under the arrangements
negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Section 5 will deal with the progress of trade
liberalization agreed in the Uruguay Round which is of specific interest of developing
economies such as those undertakings affecting textiles and clothing as well as
agriculture. Section 6 will cover issues related to rules whose solution is essential for the
success of the next round of multilateral trade negotiations. The first issue is related to the
need to improve international disciplines concerning the application of anti dumping
duties. The second issue relates to the core of the WTO activities and involves
strengthening the multilateral capacity to restrain the adoption of unilateral measures by
specific high leverage specific countries. The final section includes the conclusions in the
form of a first attempt to establish taxonomies  according to specific interests of
particular Latin American and Caribbean countries in specific issues under negotiation.
2. Market access: potential interest in multilateral negotiations and trade geographical
concentration
      To gauge what is at stake in the next round of multilateral trade negotiations in
the World Trade Organization from a Latin America perspective it important to have a
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clear idea of the present trade flows and size of domestic markets of Latin American
economies. Table 2.1 summarizes such information, presenting statistics on gross
national product at purchasing power parity rates and total (imports plus exports) trade
for most Latin American and Caribbean economies. While the impact on trade of further
liberalization is likely to be greater in economies with greater trade flows, the impact of
liberalization concerning many issues under discussion in the World Trade Organization,
such as intellectual property or services, is likely to be proportional to the size of the
domestic markets of member economies.
What emerges from such trade data is that Mexico is by far the most important
trading economy in Latin America: its total trade is almost 40% of total Latin American
trade (on a gross basis), more than 25% higher than total Mercosur trade and almost
double total trade of the second Latin American trading nation which is Brazil.
Mercosur’s total trade is only some 15% below total trade of all other Latin American
and Caribbean economies, Mexico excepted.
In terms of size of the economies, Mercosur corresponds to 44.4% of the total
GNP-PPP (of which Brazil  31.9%), Mexico to 24.1%, the Andean group as a whole to
about 20% and Chile to 5.5%. All other economies together thus account for around 6%
of the aggregate. These data may say something about comparative leverage in the
negotiations, even if at a rather low level of leverage given the small size of all Latin
American and Caribbean economies if compared with the main developed economies.
But they say little on the importance of multilateral negotiations for each particular
economy.
While it is useful to try to establish taxonomies of Latin American and Caribbean
economies according to specific interests in particular issues to begin to answer this
second question it is important to remember that negotiations related to the creation of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas, encompassing all the Western hemisphere economy
with the exception of Cuba, are, at least in principle, supposed to end by 2005. It seems
reasonable to believe that the more concentrated is the trade of a given economy or set of
economies in Western Hemisphere markets the more intense will be the interest of such6
Table 2.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: Gross






Andean Group 631 95.4
   Bolivia 18.8***  3.2
   Colombia 251.7 27.0
   Ecuador 57.5  10.6
   Peru 108.7 14.3
   Venezuela 194.3  40.3
Caricom 26.5 17.2
   Bahamas 3.3**** 3.2
   Barbados 1.7**** 1.3
   Belize 0.6**** 0.5
   Dominica 0.3 0.3
   Grenada 0.4 0.2
   Guyana 2.4 1.1
   Jamaica 8.9 4.9
   St Vincent and
        Grenadines 0.5 0.4
Trinidad and Tobago 8.4 5.3
CACM 107.1 29.8
   Costa Rica 22.5 8.5
   El Salvador 16.7 5.6
   Guatemala 43.1 7.1
   Honduras 13.8 6.6
   Nicaragua 11.0 2.0
Mercosur 1421.9 181.5
    Argentina 355.0 55.6
    Brazil 1019.9 115.3
    Paraguay 19.7 4.2
    Uruguay 27.3 6.4
 Nafta
     Mexico 770.3 220.2
Other
   Chile 176.6 35.9
   Dominican Republic 36.8 11.2
   Haiti 8.6 1.1
   Panama 19.2  19.7
   Suriname 1.2 1.1
*GNP PPP in 1997 from World Bank, World Development
Report 1998.
**Trade data: exports plus imports in 1997 from International
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1998.
*** 1995.
****Uncorrected GNP data.
an economy or set of economies in a regional hemispheric integration initiative as
opposed to multilateral negotiations.  Indeed, in the case of Mexico, already a member of7
a preferential trade area which includes the United States, this adjustment in evaluating
the issues at stake is essential.
Table 2.2 below presents data on the relative importance for each economy or set
of economies in Latin America and the Caribbean of both intra-FTA trade and of trade
within the Western Hemisphere. Interpretation of the data change quite dramatically
when account is taken of trade orientation. The concentration of Mexican and, to a lesser
extent, Central American trade with Western Hemisphere partners, and especially the
United States, reduces significantly their potential stake in new multilateral negotiations.
What makes a difference between the two cases is that while Central American
economies would wish to be included in an FTAA, Mexico is already a member of
NAFTA. On the other hand, Mercosur and Chile, with about half of their total trade with
economies outside the hemisphere, would in principle have more at stake in the new
multilateral round in spite of Mercosur being less open than many other Latin American
economies. This is indeed the reciprocal of the argument which rationalizes the less than
enthusiastic stance of a country such as Brazil concerning the FTAA. The bottom line
argument is that there is not trade enough with the hemisphere to justify becoming a
partner of an FTAA at least in the time span which seemed to be initially preferred by the
United States and in competition with multilaterally agreed liberalization.  The Andean
Group, especially Colombia, as well as Caricom economies, are in the intermediate group
in terms of  share of trade with the hemisphere. But much of the Caricom trade outside
the hemisphere is explained by special arrangements under the European Union
preferential regime for ACP countries.
From the viewpoint of many of the Latin American economies most likely to
consider multilateral negotiations as vital for their interests, since a significant share of
their current trade is with countries outside the hemisphere, the main distortion to be
removed in relation to market access is the asymmetrical treatment between agricultural
and industrial products. This is certainly the case for Mercosur members and also to a
lesser extent for Colombia. In the other extreme of the spectre, Chile, Peru and some of8
the Central American and Caribbean economies may be rather less enthusiastic about
collective commitments to reduce agricultural protection rapidly.
4
Table 2.2
Share of  intra-FTA trade in total trade and share of trade
outside  the Western Hemisphere for selected economies
and selected FTAs







Andean Group 0.109 0.293 (0.329**)
    Colombia 0.147 (Andean) 0.346
    Venezuela 0.079 (Andean) 0.179
Caricom 0.108 0.368 (0.407**)
CACM 0.123 0.217 (0.248**)
Mercosur 0.228 0.494 (0.640**)
     Argentina 0.297 (Mercosur) 0.460
     Brazil 0.166 (Mercosur) 0.528
     Mexico 0.821 (Nafta) 0.137
     Chile 0.141 (Mercosur) 0.532
*In 1997. Data from International Monetary Fund, Direction
 of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1998.
**Excluding intra-FTA trade.
Negotiation strategies outlined by the major trading economies have reflected
their intention to preserve such distortions. The United States has stated its interest in a
selective approach based on sectoral liberalization showing, implicitly, its resistance to
the application of tariff reduction formulae which would affect tariff peaks which protect
sensitive products. On the other hand, the European Union ventilated its preference for
the application of formulae to reduce tariffs such as to assure automatic trade
liberalization over the board. But this explicitly excluded agricultural products.
While further agricultural trade liberalization is part of the built-in agenda the
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 expansion of the agenda on market access to include industrial products shall meet much
resistance from developing economies unless a credible quid pro quo can be presented.
The effects of recent financial crises in most Latin American economies have given a
new lease of life to protectionist lobbies under pressure following unilateral trade
liberalization in the 1980’s and early 1990’s partly bound in the tariff schedules which
resulted from the Uruguay Round. The political leverage of protectionist lobbies in Latin
America has been strengthened but it is counterbalanced by the export interests
committed to a reduction of the persistent industrial tariff peaks which significantly affect
the exports of most economies in Latin America, especially those with a higher share of
manufactured exports in total exports: Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina.
New empirical work by Hertel and Martin (1999) in spite of limitations of which
perhaps the most important is the adoption of applied rather than current tariff schedules.
has shown that a standard tariff cut of 40% in the next round of multilateral trade
negotiations would benefit relatively more the developing economies as possible welfare
gains would amount to a maximum in the region of 1.5-2.0% of total income for some
Asian economies contrasted to 0.1-0.2% for most developed economies. Brazil’s income
would increase by 0.5% and that of other Latin America by 0.2-0.3%. This among other
things reflects the fact that tariffs on industrial products in developed economies are
much lower than those raised in developing economies.
A complication involving market access is that most Latin American and
Caribbean economies are applying tariffs which are below bound tariff levels agreed in
the Uruguay Round. There have been suggestions that developed countries would be
unwilling to accept that additional liberalization commitments by developing economies
would take bound tariff levels as reference and that applied rates should be a more
appropriate benchmark. This, besides being a rather innovative interpretation of what a
bound tariff rate is, would introduce an undesirable additional source of unequal
treatment between developing and developed economies as in most cases developed
countries applied and bound tariff rates coincide.  Many countries in the region bound10
their rates at 35% in the Uruguay Round but applied rates are typically below 15% for
most of the bigger economies.
The application of any of the two tariff reduction methodologies proposed by the
United States and the European Union would assure that tariff peaks remain as
unwarranted exceptions in the long-term trend towards over the board trade liberalization
which should be the main feature of the multilateral negotiation effort. Ideally tariffs
should be reduced by the application of formulae but in such a way as to assure that tariff
(or tariff equivalent) levels above a relatively high threshold, say 30 or 40%, mainly
agricultural products but also industrial tariff peaks, would rapidly converge to such a
threshold while a formula (of the Swiss type?) would be applied to reduce tariff levels
under the threshold. In a second stage of trade liberalization a formula could be
universally applied without the exclusion of any product.
 Such a big effort to liberalize agricultural trade in relation to market access will
have to be accompanied by the elimination of export subsidies and the curtailment of
domestic support. But in Seattle it has proved impossible to mention the elimination of
expor subsidies as a target and to exclude multifunctionality, a concept which is bound to
provide a pretext to delay the dismantling of agricultutal protectionism. Some Latin
American and Caribbean economies which are food importers, especially in Central
America and the Caribbean, will probably have a strong  interest in contingent measures
of financial support to cope with  possible price rises. New estimates of the impact of
agricultural liberalization on the price of agricultural commodities, however, have tended
to qualify the results obtained earlier which suggested a significant rise in world prices. A
recent paper by Anderson, Erwidodo and Ingco (1999) has once again stressed the
benefits of agricultural liberalization and the fact that one third of the gains entailed in a
total liberalization scenario would result from removing distortions in the market for
agricultural products in OECD economies in spite of the share of only 4% of agriculture
in OECD global GDP.
The emphasis placed by recent work by Mattoo (1999) on the importance to stress
competition in the provision of services rather than simply increasing the scope for11
foreign ownership is welcomed.  The joint main target of assuring competition together
with widening the scope for foreign ownership depends crucially on effective regulation.
The scope for technical assistance here is very wide. Indeed, if some developed
economies have been reticent on any multilaterally agreed commitments on competition
policy based on argument that a condition for such an initiative is the removal of the
inter-country heterogeneity of the institutional maturity of the legal framework and of
enforcement agencies, exactly the same arguments should be applied to regulatory
framework in developing economies. The services agenda includes both negotiation of
rules such as those on safeguards and subsidies and commitments covering new sectors.
There are important discrepancies between developed and developing countries on the
desired timing of such negotiations as the latter would of course prefer to further the
negotiation of rules that would enhance their capacity to compete both domestically and
abroad. Of special interest to developing economies, and especially of the bigger Latin
American economies with a particular interest in the market for construction services, is
the improvement of rules on temporary presence of natural persons.
3. Non-traditional issues
In principle quite a few themes not traditionally dealt by the GATT or the WTO could
be eventually included in the agenda. A stance adopted by many developing countries
before Seattle was that there was already too much to be done in relation to the built-in
agenda and pending implementation and that it would not be a first priority to broaden
the agenda. The previous WTO ministerial meeting at Singapore in 1996 agreed to have
work programmes in four issues which were strong candidates to be included in the
negotiating agenda of the aborted new round: competition policies, trade facilitation,
transparency in government procurement and investment. There seems to be no
particularly strong objection by most developing countries on the possible inclusion of
competition policies and trade facilitation. In the case of competition policies difficulties
are more likely to occur among developed economies  because of the extreme disparity in
the maturity of institutions and policies related to competition policy. Developing
economies have traditionally resisted to sign multilateral agreements on government12
procurement and it is unlikely that such a stance will change radically. It is reasonable to
suppose that the relatively bigger economies in Latin America would tend to resist more
to undertakings related to public procurement as present domestic suppliers would be
more likely to displaced by foreign suppliers. On the investment issue, Latin American
countries are unlikely to have resistance to the very cautious stance which is likely to be
adopted by most WTO members limiting efforts to desirability of “educational and
analytical work”on FDI.
In relation to the other important non-traditional issues such as labour rights and
environment not only it was difficult to see a demandeur role for Latin America but they
seem to provide a strong case for the adoption of obstructionist stances by most Latin
American and Caribbean economies. Especially in the case of labour rights as it is
difficult to single out a developing country which is not suspicious of a possible misuse
of a so-called harmonized approach to labour standards. This explains why the US
insistence in the creation of a working group on labour standards in Seattle in fact
blocked the launching of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. The
obstructionist stance of Latin America and the Caribbean in relation to trade-related
environmental matters is likely to be less homogeneous. In contrast with the history of
US-Mexico difficulties on environmental matters in the NAFTA negotiations, cross-
border issues tend to be unimportant for other Latin American countries  and the potential
difficulties would be more likely to be in the policy harmonization context concerning
global externalities generated by the emission of gases due to fuel consumption and also
deforestation. The bigger economies are more likely to be targeted as generator of
undesirable externalities and the more so countries such as Brazil where environmental
issues related to the preservation of the rain forest are superimposed to the more general
problem of fuel emission.
The fact that relatively more damage to the environment per unit of output results
from economic activity in developing economies than in developed economies is not a
valid argument for the adoption of policies targeting the overall minimization of impact
on the environment which are not the result of multilateral agreements. An effective13
system of incentives to curb pollution multilaterally does not include the possibility of
creating WTO-legal obstacles to trade conditional on the attainment of minimum
emission standards. It probably includes side payments, mainly funded by developed
economies,  to foster the preservation of resources now facing  depletion at an
undesirable rate.
It is ironical that environment and labour standards, exactly those issues which raise
more clearly the implicit danger of damage to the fabric of multilateral negotiation
consensus slowly built in the last fifty years, that there is more pressure to open the
debate to include groups of pressure purporting to democratically represent the interests
at stake, especially in the developed economies. Given the political economy of
protectionism in such economies and the fundamental role played by asymmetrical
perceptions between different economic actors on the impact of protection on their
income it is not unreasonable to have sympathy with those who are skeptical about a
positive role (from an efficiency point of view) which could be played by such pressure
groups and their allies. Inefficient steel makers, say in the US, are able to obtain
protection from the US government in the form of antidumping duties  in spite of the cost
entailed by higher steel prices in the domestic market  because steel consumers have
more diffuse interests and are unable to resist their lobbying power. There is nothing to
assure that the NGOs involved in the “harmonization” of environment and labour
standards are not captured by such protection lobbies which are keenly seeking a
modernization of arguments used to cover up their lack of competitiveness.
At the same time it seems highly artificial that the theme of democracy and the
WTO is raised in connection with the role of the NGOs and the near riot atmosphere
which marked the Seattle ministerial. It is only reasonable that many members of the
organization vented their dissatisfaction with a situation where there was the suspicion of
manipulation of aggressive NGOs with a platform which tended to coincided with that of
the host country. Some observers did not fail to mention that if the theme of democracy
in the WTO  was to be considered seriously, analysis should start with the different14
weight attached to the participation of member countries as attested by “green room”
negotiations and other traditional WTO practices.
4. Special and differential treatment
The S&D issue remains one of most difficult to deal adequately with in a new round.
In the Uruguay Round S&D was mostly confined to the adoption of extended periods to
cope with new rules if compared to the periods allowed in the case of developed
economies as well as to possible provision of technical assistance. Typically extended
periods for full implementation has been generally assured to developing country
members and exemption from implementation has been granted to least-developed
countries. In many cases the treatment of least developed and other developing countries
has been different.
This differentiation of adjustment periods affects agricultural liberalization
commitments concerning both domestic support and export subsidies, application of
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs valuation, withdrawal of existing trade
related investment measures,  imposition of safeguards, use of export subsidies and
commitment to trade-related intellectual property disciplines. In the case of trade-related
investment measures departures from rules which establish the nature of TRIMs  which
are prohibited are regulated by the same regime of exceptions as those under article
XVIII GATT 1994, the relevant Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions
of GATT 1994 and the Declaration on the Measures Taken for Balance of Payments
Purposes adopted in 1979 as a result of  the framework negotiations. As indicated by
Casaburi, Henderson, Quintiloni and Tussie (1999) for Argentina it is likely that
industrial interests in most Latin American economies with a more developed industrial
base would welcome a revision of the constraints imposed by the present commitments
on TRIMs, especially in the case of the automotive industry which expects that their main
offices are going to engage in the defense of their interests to extend special arrangements
favouring the industry in many Latin American economies. The  economic rationality of
such arrangements, which generally involve subsidies tied to export performance, is scant15
from the point of view of the country which attracts foreign investment. The inclusion of
such an instrument  in the negotiating agenda in spite  of its inefficiency is a reflection of
the clout of such sectors in the political economy of protection rather than of any genuine
“national interest”.
TRIPs is an issue which is of more general interest for Latin American and Caribbean
economies than TRIMs. There is a much better case for the inclusion of  TRIPs in a
revision agenda from a social point of view as the increased cost of the relevant protected
products is likely to affect the poor and the very poor in developing economies,
especially in the case of pharmaceutical products. However, in contrast with TRIMs there
is no hope that the bargaining power of multinationals could be used to further a revision
of the agreed implementation periods. Rather the reverse is the case, as pharmaceutical
multinationals are very keen on the importance of the agreed implementation period to
assure increased revenues as intellectual property rules are better enforced in developing
economies.
In other cases the references to differential treatment for developing member
countries of the WTO is extremely vague such as those related to technical barriers,
import licensing, the imposition of antidumping countervailing duties and rules and
procedures related to dispute settlement. In this latter case the exhortation to take into
account different levels of development of economies on whose products AD duties are
imposed seems to have been completely disregarded in the recent history of imposition of
such countervailing duties.
There is a very strong feeling among developing countries that this has been an
unsatisfactory way to assure that some of the WTO disciplines were adequately
modulated to cope with the sharp contrasts in development levels among WTO members.
The essential difference between the approach adopted in Uruguay Round and these
criticisms is that simple extension of implementation periods implies that given time
and/or sufficient technical assistance it will be possible to remove inherent disadvantages
which affect the competitiveness of developing economies vis à vis developed16
economies. Criticisms imply that such difficulties will only be solved by the convergence
of the levels of development of developed and developing member countries. The
essential problem here is that to reopen the issue of how the S&D issue has been
addressed in the Uruguay Round agreements and re-negotiate such terms is likely to have
a cost in terms of fresh additional concessions by the developing country members of the
WTO. The main proponents of such a move seem to be oblivious to the likely costs of the
adoption of such alternatives.
Another pending issue related to S&D refers to preferential treatment accorded to
imports of developing countries in the markets of developed economies under GSP
schemes.There is also a near consensus in developing countries that rules concerning
such preferences should be more automatic and stable overtime so that the concession of
preferences is not, as it should be, unilateral and is transformed into a negotiation to
extract specific concessions from beneficiaries. There may be scope for a more formal set
of rules to be adopted for preferences now granted – or which should be granted –  under
the umbrella of the GSP and the GSTP. This could include a universal system of variable
preferences decreasing with the level of income of the recipient economy until graduation
and withdrawal of preferences. Low income countries would receive 100% preferences
from all other groups. Countries in an intermediate group would receive, say,  50%
preferences from the high income group. The system would be of automatic application
as thresholds would be defined by GNP-PPP levels. Promotion and graduation would be
once and for all.
5. Implementation of Uruguay Round Agreements
Now that efforts to launch the Millenium Round have failed, the dangers of conflict
between liberalization timetables agreed under the Uruguay Round and under the new
round are much reduced. Two major themes emerge in relation to the implementation
timetable of the Uruguay Round results: agriculture, and textile and clothing. The
programmed liberalization timetable resulting from the aborted Millenium Round was to
be effective from the beginning of 2003. Problems were perhaps less likely to surface in17
the case of agriculture as full implementation of reduction commitments for economies
other than developing  and least-developed country members is set to be complete by the
end of 2001. But there many problems do arise from the implementation of results
concerning agriculture, especially on expedient notification of allowed subsidies and
transparency in relation to quota allocation. There have been complaints by agricultural
exporters on the lack of expediency by importers in providing full information on such
issues as required under the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture, especially quotas,
with the consequence that agricultural imports are reduced. Even more importantly, the
so-called peace clause, which blocks the use of countervailing duties on agricultural is to
run until the end of 2004.
  In the case of textiles the WTO agreement on Textiles and Clothing involves the
operation of a Textiles Monitoring Body which has essentially to supervise the pace of
the liberalization according to the three-phase schedule, the enlargement of existing
quotas and the use of transitional safeguards. The implementation period is to last until
the end of 2004. It is well known that importers have padded their list of products
included in the transitional list so as to artificially extend the regime of high protection
typical of the MFA. If a Millenium Round had been launched in Seattle it is not unlikely
that the period when this backloading came to be affected  by liberalization would
coincide with the beginning of implementation of the new round results. The issue of the
balance of concessions between developed and developing country members was  bound
to arise due to a possible over lapping and the related danger of procrastination to
dismantle the remnants of the MFA. These risks seem to have now receded.
6. Rules and related issues
 The revision of some WTO rules is essential for the success of a possible  next
round of multilateral trade negotiations. One of the most important is related to the need
to improve international disciplines concerning the application of antidumping duties,
whose determination process is often crowned by the imposition of disguised voluntary
export restraints. The constraints imposed by present rules on the findings of panels,18
which limit their scope to the verification of facts, is a severe curtailment of the capacity
to adequately solve grievances related to antidumping at the multilateral level. Given the
present rules it is extremely unlikely that multilateral dispute settlement will be able to
dilute the asymmetries of bilateral bargaining power involved in the imposition of
antidumping countervailing duties.
Another important issue relates to the core of the WTO activities and involves
strengthening the multilateral capacity of restraining the ability of specific countries to
adopt unilaterally measures without recourse to the full possibilities of the multilateral
dispute settlement system. There is a gray area related to the WTO-legality of unilateral
actions used in the past  by the US under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as
amended and of similar EC regulations which may be created. A recent WTO panel
found that parts of sections 304, 305 and 306 of US Trade Act of 1974 were not GATT or
WTO-inconsistent but with the proviso that   its findings were based in full or in part on
US undertakings articulated in the Statement of Administrative Action approved by the
US Congress at the time it implemented the Uruguay Round agreements and confirmed
in the statements by the US to the panel. The panel stated that should those undertakings
be repudiated or in any other way removed, its findings of conformity would no longer be
warranted. The question of whether the use of such instruments is compatible with
WTO’s multilaterally agreed disciplines and if these latter contribute to dampen the
disparities between the bargaining clout of different WTO member countries remains
dormant. 
5
Both in the case of antidumping and of 301-type instruments the more developed
and bigger Latin American economies are more likely to consider their inclusion as a
priority in their negotiating agenda than the smaller economies, a consequence of their
importance as exporters of sensitive products to developed economies.
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7.  Conclusions
Very schematically an attempt can be made to build up taxonomies based on the
concrete interests of different Latin American and Caribbean economies based on the
material presented in the previous sections. One could perhaps consider three different
sets of economies: Mercosur, and perhaps also Colombia; Mexico, and perhaps also Peru
and Venezuela; and all small economies of the Caribbean and Central America. The only
group with specific emphasis on the issue of access of goods would be would be
Mercosur and Colombia and their interest in agriculture. The more advanced economies,
and more prominently Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile, would have common
interests in a whole set of access-related issues which would cover services, AD
countervailing, and unilateral measures of the 301 type. Finally, possibly almost all
economies in Latin America and the Caribbean would converge to a core platform. This
concerns the reluctance to accept disciplines concerning the environment and labour
standards and the keenness  to reopen the transition period agreement concerning TRIPs
so as to reduce the cost of intellectual property-related remittances in an extended
transition period.
Of course, it does not follow from this rough evaluation of the convergence of
interests of different Latin American and Caribbean economies that their role should be
limited to a negative agenda centered in attempts to obstruct initiatives concerning the
environment and labour rights as well as to attempt to reopen the transitional period
agreed in the TRIPs negotiations. Experience on such a strategy has been accumulated
during the Uruguay Round and it indicates that it is a mistake to abandon the role of
demandeur based on points of principle. It should be recognized, however, that the
defensive stance of developing economies concerning harmonization of policies related
to labour and the environment seems to provide a much firmer coalition ground than
opposition to the inclusion of services in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
From a demandeur point of view there is scope for the Latin American members
of the Cairns group to press for a more significant effort to liberalize agricultural trade.
There is also scope for an ampler loose coalition mainly of the bigger economies in Latin20
America related to services (mainly temporary labour movements),  limitations of dispute
settlement machinery in the case of AD countervailing and the imposition of unilateral
measures of the Section 301 type by the US and the European Union.21
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